Table of Contents
- Simple Summary
- Backwards Compatibility
- Test Cases
- Security Considerations
Provide access to the original recipient of a transaction.
This EIP introduces the following EVM instruction:
This instruction is meant to provide access to the original recipient of the transaction, the
to address, enabling new ways of introspection to be applied in conjunction with EIP-3508.
It is undeniable that smart contracts are becoming more interconnected than ever. Up until this point, smart contracts have entirely relied on compliant interfaces and introspection to introduce a new step in the call chain of a complex multi-contract interaction. However, this presents a forwards-only approach which limits the types of interactions that can manifest.
The purpose of this EIP is to provide a way via which a contract is able to identify the entry-point of a transaction on the blockchain and deduce what was the original intention of the transaction by applying introspection on the original transaction data itself.
This EIP enables the development of new types of smart contracts as it can open new pathways for EIP-721 NFTs and EIP-20 tokens to detect which action their transaction is part of, such as detecting a liquidity provision to a decentralized exchange or a loan within a collateralized lending protocol.
ENTRYPOINT instruction uses 0 stack arguments and pushes the original
to member of the transaction onto the stack. The address yielded by the instruction is a 160-bit value padded to 256-bits. The operation costs
G_base to execute, similarly to
The address returned by the
ENTRYPOINT opcode will be equivalent to the
to address parameter specified in the nearest
AUTHCALL up the stack. If there is no
AUTHCALL in the stack then
ENTRYPOINT will retrieve the original transaction’s
The EIP-3074 introduced a new call instruction called
0xf7) that will replace a transaction’s
0x32) with the context variable
authorized. The intention of
AUTHCALL is to prevent discrimination between smart contracts and EOAs which
ORIGIN initially facilitated. The
ENTRYPOINT opcode by itself re-introduces discrimination into the system as it indirectly allows one to evaluate whether the smart contract code being executed is done so by an EOA by validating that
ENTRYPOINT == ADDRESS where
0x30) retrieves the currently executing account address. Therefore, it is sensible also replace the values retrieved by the
ENTRYPOINT opcode to the target of an
This interaction ensures full compatibility with EIP-3074 and ensures that no form of discrimination is introduced back into the system by this EIP.
ENTRYPOINT instruction came to be by defining a sensible name that immediately and clearly depicts what it is meant to achieve by signaling the first interaction of a particular call, i.e. the entry-point.
Equivalent to EIP-3508.
The opcode ENTRYPOINT (
0x4a) essentially performs the same thing as the opcode ORIGIN (
0x32) and thus shares the exact same gas cost.
0x4a) instruction alone has no perceivable benefit as it can be replaced by the
0xf7) instruction and as such should solely be introduced to the system in conjunction with the
ORIGINDATA* opcodes defined in EIP-3508.
The EIP does not alter or adjust existing functionality provided by the EVM and as such, no known issues exist.
ENTRYPOINT instruction allows the association of the
ORIGINDATACOPY values with a particular smart contract address and interface, enabling introspection to be applied based on the function signature invoked and the arguments provided to reliably deduce the call-path via which a particular smart contract was invoked and allowing a more granular level of interaction to be defined in such special cases.
However, this type of introspection should solely be applied on pre-approved contracts rather than user-defined ones as the value stemming from this type of introspection entirely relies on a contract’s code immutability and proper function, both of which a user supplied contract can easily bypass.
The instructions of this EIP should not be utilized as a way to discriminate between EOA callers and smart contracts, as this type of differentiation can be broken by an
AUTHCALL as defined in the specification chapter.
The behaviour of the
ENTRYPOINT opcode during a contract creation will result in the opcode yielding the zero-address as the first address interacted with in the transaction. This should be taken into account by contract implementations in a similar fashion to how
ecrecover invalid signatures are handled to prevent software misbehaviours from arising.
Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.
Please cite this document as:
Alex Papageorgiou, "EIP-3520: Transaction Destination Opcode [DRAFT]," Ethereum Improvement Proposals, no. 3520, April 2021. [Online serial]. Available: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3520.